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Abstract 
This paper analyses the discourses produced on their websites by the two 
organisations that conducted the official ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ campaigns in the 
Brexit referendum. The analysis, which adopts the general orientation of the 
Discourse Historical Approach in CDS, is aimed at illuminating the main 
discursive strategies, argumentative schemes and key representations of Britain 
in/and Europe that sustained the ideological (de)legitimation of Brexit on either 
side. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the specific ideological 
articulation of two key discursive elements - namely trade and immigration – and 
the argumentative schemes deployed in the campaign engendered and legitimized 
a new toxic (inter)national logic of Brexit: by leaving the EU, Britain ‘takes back 
control’ to pursue mercantile policies whose benefits ‘outsiders’ should be 
excluded from. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK’s choice to leave EU constitutes an unprecedented political event which is 
likely to have profound repercussions on British and European societies for years to 
come. Why and how it happened, as well as its current and future impact have been the 
concern of an extensive body of academic work and no doubt these questions will carry 
on being debated for some time. 
This paper contributes to this general debate by approaching Brexit as the historic 
conjuncture of different social and discursive trajectories (see Zappettini and 
Krzyzanowski in this issue) and by focusing on the process of their institutional 
legitimisation. In particular, taking the vantage point of the referendum debate and its 
mediatisation, this paper analyses the discourses (re)produced and circulated on the 
websites of the two organisations designated by the UK Electoral Commission as the 
official lead campaigns for the ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ vote. These were, respectively, 
Vote Leave (VL) and Britain Stronger In Europe (BSE) (henceforth only referred to by 
their acronyms).  
The reason for focusing on these organisations is that VL and BSE were key semi-
institutional actors in the process of legitimisation of Brexit effectively contributing to 
setting the referendum agenda. Both organisations were backed up by business groups 
and other vested interests and had cross-party political support (as further elaborated 
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below); becoming the lead campaign allowed them to access vital public resources1 and 
to give significant exposure to their messages in the public domain whilst escalating 
certain political and social demands up the institutional chain of discourses (Fairclough, 
2003). From this prominent standpoint, therefore, VL and BSE had the power to 
influence public opinion on the meaning of Brexit and to frame the context of the debate 
by reproducing, challenging or silencing certain discourses and ideologies which they 
were able to associate with the generic binaries ‘leave’ and ‘remain’. 
Trading on these premises, the aim of this paper is to investigate which 
messages the two leading campaigns fostered in the public domain to support the 
desired outcome of the referendum vote and how such messages contributed to the 
wider conjuncture of Brexit. In particular, this paper delves into the main discursive 
strategies, argumentative schemes and key representations of Britain in/and Europe that 
sustained the (de)legitimation of Brexit on either side to address the fundamental 
questions: ‘why and how did Brexit occur and for whose benefit’? It is contended that, 
through the institutional framing of the referendum campaign in antagonistic camps, the 
ideological articulation of discourses of trade and immigration engendered and 
legitimized a new toxic (inter)national logic of Brexit: by leaving the EU, Britain ‘takes 
back control’ to pursue mercantile policies whose benefits ‘outsiders’ should be 
excluded from.  
This paper adopts the general theoretical and methodological orientation of the 
Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (Wodak et al., 2009; Krzyzanowski, 2010).  
Drawing on the DHA heuristic operationalization  section two discusses the socio-
political background, the specific institutional framing, and the genre of the Brexit 
                                                 
1 Designated campaigns were entitled to public grants (up to £7m), free mailing and broadcasts 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-360386721.  
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referendum campaign. Section three unpacks the analytical approach applied to the data.  
Section four presents and discusses the most salient findings and some critical 
conclusions are finally drawn in Section five. 
2. The context of production of discourses  
2.1 Social and political background to the Brexit referendum  
 
Since joining the then EEC in 1973, British Governments have historically adopted an 
‘outsider’ stance towards the European project (Daddow, 2005) regarding it primarily as 
a transactional affair rather than a political goal or a social endeavour. Following the 
expansion of the EU over the last two decades, British Euroscepticism and opposition to 
European integration have increasingly been appropriated by domestic politics defining 
the resurgence of English nationalism (Welling, 2007). Notably, in the last few years, 
the UK’s discomfort with EU-rope have coincided with the rise of the right-wing UK 
Independence Party (UKIP). Fuelled by UKIP’s propaganda and widely echoed by 
strongly anti-EU tabloid press, calls for an ‘independent’ Britain and for a ‘repatriation’ 
of powers from Brussels became increasingly widespread discourses among Tory 
‘rebel’ backbenchers. In response to these demands, in 2013 the then Prime Minister 
David Cameron pledged that the next Conservative government would ask the British 
people for a mandate to negotiate a new settlement with the EU. Having won the 
general elections in 2015 and having reached a ‘deal’ with his EU partners, Mr 
Cameron called for an in/out referendum whilst he pledged to champion the UK’s 
continuing membership of the EU.  
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Significantly, the referendum took place amid a series of economic and 
humanitarian ‘crises’ and in the eighth year of austerity politics that had exacerbated 
social inequalities in European and British societies. As Jessop (2017) notes:  
“The crucial issue that remained largely unvoiced [in Brexit] was that real or 
imagined crisis symptoms were not caused by membership of the European Union 
as such. Rather, they were rooted in its neoliberal form, the crisis of Eurozone 
crisis-management, and the long-run failure to address crucial domestic issues that 
undermined economic and extra-economic competitiveness” (p. 138). 
In many respects, the referendum stirred the public sentiment over the causes of 
this economic crisis and became to be regarded by many as a symbolic vote about 
economic issues, globalisation, and multiculturalism as much as it was about the UK-
EU relationship.  As post-referendum research into socio-demographics has shown, the 
UK regions that voted for Brexit were also those areas most affected by growing social, 
cultural, and economic inequalities (Savage and Cunningham, 2016). The Brexit vote 
however also played out along several other axes showing that several dividing lines 
and cleavages existed within the British voters based on their age, education, urban vs. 
rural locations and their attitudes towards open/close views of the world (Cooper, 
2016).   
According to a poll conducted in February 2016 (Kellner, 2016) there was a 
distinct divide between ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’ in what the two sides believed the 
causes of the UK’s economic problems were. For ‘in’ voters, the top three factors to 
blame were British banks, the Conservative-led government since 2010 and growing 
inequality. For ‘out’ voters these were: EU rules and regulations, immigrants willing to 
work for low wages and the last Labour government. In other words, for ‘leavers’ the 
causes of the crisis were factors outside the UK, while for ‘remainers’ the factors were 
internal to the UK. Similarly, according to another poll (Bailey, 2016) immigration 
 6 
topped the list of the most important issues in the EU referendum for ‘leavers’ but was 
much less important for ‘remainers’. Crucially, the concern with immigration became 
particularly acute in the two weeks before the referendum when “[i]mmigration ha[d] 
now surpassed the economy becoming the most important issue for voters” (Skinner, 
2016). According to the same survey, by focusing on immigration issues, the leave 
campaign was getting better traction, for example with 45 per cent of the sample of 
voters believing that a vote for remain would be followed by Turkey gaining fast-track 
entry to the EU and its population effectively granted free movement into the UK. 
These negative perceptions were compounded (and amplified by the media, especially 
British tabloids) in public discourses of ‘Europe in crisis’ which followed the series of 
terrorist attacks in various European cities and the displacement of Syrian and other 
refugees who had attempted to reach Europe. These different representations of crisis 
contributed to create general negative perceptions of European freedom of movement 
and to frame immigration flows as a threat to Britain.    
Finally, domestic political factors must also be considered as the context in 
which discourses of the referendum played out. Firstly, the Conservative party saw a 
number of cabinet members breaking ranks to join the ‘leave’ campaign as they were in 
disagreement with the PM whom they accused of having brought home from Brussels 
an unsatisfactory and too watered down ‘deal’. Whilst the remain campaign was notably 
supported by the PM and the Chancellor of Exchequer, the leave campaign was 
championed by key figures such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson who were 
instrumental in mass mediating the ‘leave’ message. Secondly, the Labour Party failed 
to commit to a convincing unified stance with its leader Jeremy Corbyn - who had 
previously declared himself a Eurosceptic - only showing a lukewarm support for the 
‘remain’ choice towards the later stages of the campaign.  
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2.2. Institutional framing and actors of the Brexit campaign 
 
Along with the macro socio-political context, one must also consider the institutional 
framing of the debate as a key context in which discourse of Brexit emerged and were 
circulated during the campaign. As Koopmans and Olzak (2004) suggest in relation to 
political mobilization, the political-institutional setting in which discourses are 
embedded provides ‘discursive opportunities’ (and constraints) for the framing, 
diffusion, and impact of messages in the public sphere. Visibility, resonance, and public 
legitimacy of a discourse are acquired (or challenged) through the interaction of key 
actors along the discursive chain: the claim makers, the institutional gatekeepers, and 
the media (Fairclough, 2003) 
In the case of Brexit, the call for the referendum polarised different interests and 
different actors around pro-Remain/Leave programmes which competed to be 
designated as the official lead campaigns by the Electoral Commission. The Electoral 
Commission is an independent body set up by the UK Parliament which regulates party 
and election finance and sets standards for well-run elections. As, in the case of 
referendums, its task is to choose the candidate whom  “represent those campaigning for 
the [referendum] outcome to the greatest extent” (Electoral Commission, 2016), the 
Electoral Commission effectively acted as a key institutional gatekeeper of the debate 
framing. 
On 13 April 2016 the Electoral Commission designated VL and BSE as the 
official campaign on each side. BSE was a Westminster-based group backed by 
different pro-EU campaign associations and relied on funding from different financial 
organisations and businesspersons. VL branched out of Business for Britain, a coalition 
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of Eurosceptics linked to the Confederation of British Industry, and was backed by 
senior Conservative as well as Labour politicians. Each organisation was, in turn, 
endorsed by civic and business associations2. Whilst BSE was the only applicant for the 
Remain side, the GO movement - notably supported by UKIP’s Nigel Farage and 
funded by multi-millionaire donor Arron Banks – was the other major ‘leave’ 
contender. Despite some initial in-fights between VL and the GO movement following 
the Electoral Commission’s decision, Nigel Farage claimed that his party “would work 
with anyone who wanted to leave the EU” (The Independent, 2016). Similarly, UKIP’s 
donor Mr Banks expressed his support for VL as he saw its appointment as 
conveniently appealing to those Eurosceptics who regarded Mr. Farage as a too divisive 
figure (BBC, 2016). Whilst therefore operating from the background, UKIP would 
effectively run a parallel campaign in support of VL, voicing in particular the ‘question 
of immigration’ which shifted the centre of gravity away from the original VL’s 
economic case for leaving the EU. 
Crucially, the institutional endorsement of VL and BSE as the two lead 
campaigns (and the media amplification of their messages) contributed to define the 
discursive frame of the debate along the particular agendas of the two organisations, 
allowing them to escalate the political demands of their representatives and to project on 
the Leave/Remain binaries selected representations of the issues at stake.  
 
2.3. Media entextualization of Brexit discourses 
 
                                                 
2 For details of endorsers see: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/eu-
referendum/designation-of-lead-campaigners-for-the-eu-referendum 
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Texts produced for referendum campaigns belong to a discursive genre aimed at 
forming public opinion and persuading voters in favour of a particular choice by 
legitimizing a specific political goal or course of action as the ‘right’ choice (in this case 
leaving or remaining in the EU). As shown by a range of studies (Vreese, 2007), 
depending on the issue being deliberated, referendum campaigns can conform to a 
rational genre of deliberative argumentation (for example drawing on facts to construct 
arguments) as well as to a genre that mainly appeals to emotional and ideological 
positions (such as the sense of belonging to national or political communities). With 
Internet-based platforms increasingly appropriated in politics as powerful machineries 
in the strategic mobilisation of public opinion (Chadwick and Howard, 2010) these 
discursive genres have gradually moved towards digitalized productions. In the case of 
the Brexit referendum, the digital mediatisation of messages was instrumental to the 
final outcome of the referendum as a large proportion of the advertising budget of the 
lead campaigns was spent online and involved delivering the key messages to 
undecided voters via ‘big data’ aggregation and social media targeting (Hilder, 2017). 
The process of digital entextualisation of the campaign thus opened up new 
‘discursive opportunities’ for the key referendum actors to de/recontextualise historical 
and ongoing discourses of Britain and/in Europe into new semiotic realizations that 
would fit into or indeed drive the leave/remain narratives. Crucially, in the process of 
entextualisation new interdiscursive relations between arguments and other linguistic 
elements could potentially be created which would create new orders of discourses and 
enable new logics associated with them to be (re)produced (Krzyżanowski, 2016).   
3. Data and analytical approach 
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Data was derived from the official websites of the two organisations3. Websites were 
consulted regularly between October 2015 and the end of June 2016 as this time frame 
effectively represents the period of maximum activity. This preliminary survey showed 
that both websites presented fairly similar features including the following prominent 
sections which discussed ‘facts’ about the EU and Britain and in which the case was 
made for either leaving or remaining: ‘Why vote leave?’ and ‘Facts about the European 
Union’(VL) and ‘The basics’ and ‘FAQs’ (BSE).  
The analysis focused on the discursive realisations which were directly available 
on the website pages of each of the above sections or accessible via hypertextual links 
through these pages. This corpus of data, consisting of a total of 81 pages of texts 
(which also included pictures and, in the case of VL, cartoons), was analysed at 
discourse-pragmatic and semiotic levels using the DHA analytical operationalization 
(Krzyzanowski, 2010). This consists of: a) a thematic analysis mapping the key 
analytical categories or discourse topics and b) an in-depth or argumentation-oriented 
analysis involving the investigation of discursive strategies, topoi and their means and 
forms of realisation. Particular attention was paid to the systematic analysis of 
argumentative schemes and warrants (Toulmin, 1958) which supported the main claim 
‘the UK should remain in/leave the EU’. In the tradition of the DHA, the analysis 
mapped the topoi (or fallacies) which were implicitly or explicitly invoked to justify 
arguments as, for example, the conditional or causal logics 'if x then y' or 'y because x' 
(Reisigl 2014). In synergy with this standard operationalization of the DHA, the 
analysis also zeroed in on the use of narratives and specific representations of the world 
as premises for framing argumentative schemes (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). The 
analysis therefore mapped representations which specifically supported the 
                                                 
3 These were: www.voteleavetakecontrol.org (VL) and www.strongerin.co.uk (BSE).  
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‘leave/remain’ claims following Fairclough and Fairclough’s distinction between: i) 
circumstantial premises (representing the context of action and identifying the issue to 
be solved); ii) goal premises (geared towards the achievement of desirable states of 
affairs); and iii) means premises (how to achieve the set goal). 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Discursive macro-topics and interdiscursive relations 
 
BSE’s discourses primarily hinged on representations of the EU as the Single Market 
and mainly focused on highlighting the benefits of the status quo and the risk of leaving 
the Single Market. BSE’s discourses largely discussed economic topics and, in some 
cases, also social and political implications derived from the membership of the Single 
Market (e.g. workers’ rights).  In addition to the dominant economic framing, BSE’s 
discursive topics included international relations and relied on representations of Britain 
as an actor in different systems of power. Whilst VL also engaged with topics related 
with the economy, its discourses were clearly framed within a neoliberal dimension and 
were driven in particular by representations of the constraints of the EU rules and EU 
laws on British businesses and on British aspirations to wider global trade. Notably, 
whilst early discourses of VL discussed economic topics and the question of 
sovereignty via legal and political arguments (discursively linked with Eurosceptic 
narratives), towards the final weeks of the campaign the focus of the Leave campaign 
increasingly shifted towards topics of immigration and free movement (paralleled by the 
UKIP campaign) as further discussed in the next section. By contrast, topics related to 
migration and sovereignty were only marginally discussed by BSE. A list of the main 
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discursive topics covered by both organisations and the main interdiscursive relations is 
provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2 while the main argumentative schemes are discussed 
in detail in the next section. 
Figure 1.  BSE’s main discursive topics and main interdiscursive relations 
 
 
Figure 2. VL’s main discursive topics and main interdiscursive relations 
 
4.2. In-depth analysis 
Main argumentative schemes of the ‘Remain’ campaign 
 
Discursive strategies of BSE were aimed, on the one hand, at highlighting the current 
benefits of the EU membership whilst, on the other, at emphasizing the negative impact 
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of Brexit on jobs, economic and social prosperity (as summarised in Figure 1 and Table 
1 below). Whilst the former strategy was achieved through positive topoi such as the 
topos of benefit, the latter strategy tended to project a negative scenario for the UK 
outside the EU (which the leave campaign dubbed ‘project fear’) and was driven by 
different  topoi of risk. Both strategies were characterised by the overt nominalisation of 
‘you and your family’ as the addressee of the benefits and the negative consequences 
and potential risk. Moreover, another conspicuous pattern in BSE discourses was the 
frequent reference to some authoritative source (argumentum ad verecundiam) to back 
up the credibility of the warrant and the conclusions as illustrated below:  
Extract 1 
Over 3 million UK jobs are linked to our trade with the EU: one in every ten jobs 
in this country (Source: HM Treasury) […] If we leave the EU experts predict that 
the economic hit would mean up to 950,000 UK jobs could be lost (Source: 
Confederation of British Industry), meaning less security for you and your family.  
Another prominent set of discourses emerging in the Remain campaign related to 
international relations and security through which BSE represented ‘Britain’s place in 
the world’. In this case, BSE made the case for remaining by emphasizing Britain’s 
leadership on the international stage through the topos of (inter)national influence:  
Extract 3 
Being a leading member of the EU, as well as in NATO and the UN, ensures that 
Britain can stand tall in the world and promote our own interests. 
In this case, whilst the topos of (inter)national influence validates the argument for 
remaining, it also represents the EU as union of states which must safeguard their own 
interests rather than an entity with supranational aims. In this sense the argument project 
an ideal clout that Britain would carry by being in an international “members’ club” 
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(along with the UN and Nato) and the national benefits deriving from such 
memberships.  
Notably, BSE did not engage substantively with discourses of immigration. Its 
discussion of this topic was limited to marginal representations of British citizens 
benefitting from visa-free opportunities to study, travel and retire anywhere across the 
EU and to representations of British businesses being able to benefit from the free 
movement of labour. 
 
Figure 3. Main argumentative schemes of the Remain campaign 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of BSE main discursive strategies, topoi, and representations 
Main Strategies Main Topoi/Fallacies Key Representations 
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Main argumentative schemes of the  ‘Leave’ campaign 
 
The main discursive thrust of the Leave side was the representation of ‘independence’ 
from the EU as an essential condition for the UK to be in control of its domestic affairs 
and to pursue an agenda of (inter)national (neo)liberalism. This macro argumentative 
scheme (as represented in Figure 2) was supported by the topos of sovereignty loss 
which can be broken down as follows: Britain has lost its sovereignty to the EU 
(circumstantial premise) which it should regain (goal premise) by no longer being a EU 
member (means premise). This overarching scheme was reproduced in more specific 
arguments in three distinct areas: economy, political/legal integration, and immigration 
which are discussed below and are summarised in Table 2 in relation to main discursive 
strategies, topoi, and representations. 
 
Figure 4. Main argumentative scheme of the Leave campaign 
Emphasizing the 
benefits of EU 
membership 
 
Emphasizing how 
Brexit would affect 
individuals and 
households 
 
Representing 
Britain’s ‘place in 
the world’. 
 
 
topos of benefit 
 
topos of risk avoidance 
 
topos of authority  
topos of (inter)national influence 
 
Individuals and 
families as part of an 
economic system 
 
 
The EU as the Single 
Market  
 
 
The world as an 
international system 
of powers 
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Table 2. Summary of BSE main discursive strategies, topoi, and representations 
Main Strategies Main Topoi/Fallacies Key Representations 
Delegitimising the 
EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prioritizing 
economic resources 
topos of sovereignty loss over trade 
 
topos of burden for businesses 
 
topos/fallacy of (inter)national influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
topos of pro bono nobis 
 
 
 
Britain ‘constrained’ 
‘tied down’ or 
‘dominated’ by the 
EU 
 
Independent Free 
trade deals as the 
solution to 
globalization 
 
Britain as a ‘proud 
trading nation’ 
 
National vs. 
transnational 
solidarity 
Rejecting or 
resisting political 
integration 
topos of risk avoidance 
 
topos of EU law supremacy 
 
The UK ostracized 
by other EU 
countries and 
dragged into a closer 
Union 
 
The ECJ meddling 
with British affairs 
Constructing moral 
panic around 
topos of sovereignty loss (over border 
control) 
Britain at risk of 
invasion by millions 
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Economic arguments 
VL’s early discourses focused on strategies of delegitimation of the EU and were 
predicated on economic arguments which represented Britain’s economic potential as 
‘constrained’, ‘tie down’ or ‘dominated’ by the EU. A number of arguments which 
characterised the leave choice as ‘freeing’ Britain from unresponsive and costly EU 
were based on topoi of burden for British businesses and were realised via the 
expression ‘red tape’, a euphemism for employment rights and social and environmental 
protection. Moreover, VL advocated the ‘leave’ choice through discourses of free trade4 
in which the EU was delegitimised as unresponsive and preventing the UK from seizing 
worldwide economic opportunities. Representations of ‘free trade deals’ were often 
discursively embraced as powerful - albeit simplistic - solutions to the constraints of the 
EU membership and the issue of reduced or lost sovereignty: 
Extract 4 
Technological and economic forces are changing the world fast. EU institutions 
cannot cope. We have lost control of vital policies. This is damaging. We need a 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of free trade and its association with neo liberal ideologies in the context of 
Brexit see Zappettini 2019. 
 
immigration  
topos/fallacy of numbers 
 
fallacy of risk avoidance 
 
fallacy of public safety 
 
of migrants 
 
Conflation of EU 
freedom of 
movement and 
illegal migration 
 
‘Open border’ 
Europe and ‘border 
vulnerability’ – 
Conflation of 
immigrant and 
criminals/terrorists 
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new relationship. […] We negotiate a new UK-EU deal based on free trade and 
friendly cooperation. We end the supremacy of EU law. We regain control.  
 
Extract 5 
We regain the power to make our own trade deals with countries around the world. 
We regain an independent voice in world trade negotiations with independent 
voting rights at the World Trade Organisation. We regain seats on other 
international rule-setting bodies that we’ve given away to the EU. We use our 
stronger international influence to work for closer international cooperation.  
In Extract 4 the argument for leaving is constructed along a simplistic logic of ‘cause 
and solution’. It rests on distinct circumstantial premises that represent globalization as 
driven by external and non-agent specific forces and on the representation of the EU as 
an unfit actor vis-à-vis such forces. The legitimation of voting leave as ‘taking control’ 
is achieved via a series of functional moves (implicitly connected albeit missing explicit 
causative connectives) towards the negotiation of a free trade UK-EU deal which is 
presented to the reader as the solution to the problem of globalization. Similarly, the 
argument put forward in Extract 5 hinges on a representation of the UK ‘regaining’ the 
power lost to the EU at the WTO table and it rests on a set of goal premises which 
legitimise Brexit as a means to a mercantile goal. In this case, the means premise is 
predicated on the topos of (inter)national influence that the UK would be able to fully 
deploy better than the EU inside the WTO and on the international stage were it an actor 
of its own rather than being represented by the EU.  In this sense, rather than a 
rationally warranted premise, the topos of (inter)national influence appears to be used as 
a fallacious rhetorical device which appeals to a nostalgic vision of Britain’s leadership 
as a ‘proud trading nation’ and which leverages on the British aspirations to be 
recognised again as a great power in its own right. 
Another set of economic arguments legitimising the leave choice relied on 
strategies of prioritizing us over them (often metonymically associated with Brussels) in 
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the sharing of economic resources and were typically realised through the topos of pro 
bono nobis (for our own benefit). One of the most prominent arguments in this sense 
was about the ‘wasted’ money that Britain pays into the EU budget which, VL claimed, 
should benefit nationals rather than ‘outsiders’: 
Extract 6 
We send about £350 million to Brussels every week. […] If we vote to ‘remain’, it 
is a vote for the permanent payment to Brussels of all this money. […] All this 
money could be better spent on the NHS, schools, and fundamental science 
research. […]  If we vote to leave, we can change the agenda. If we regain the 
power to control our own affairs, we can sort out our own problems  
This argument (which captured the public imagination also in virtue of a red bus 
campaign associated with the slogan “We send the EU £ 350 million a week. Let’s fund 
our NHS instead”) was predicated on a figure which was at best arbitrary as admitted by 
the leave campaign director 5. More significantly, the legitimacy of ‘taking control’ 
tapped into the symbolic national appeal of education and health systems (both are 
outside the remit of EU policies; the NHS is the UK’s biggest employer and has always 
represented a sensitive topic in political campaigns).  
 
Political and legal arguments 
Arguments which represented voting leave as ‘freeing’ the UK from increasing political 
and legal integration with other European countries were also frequent. These 
                                                 
5 The figure was highly contested since it does not take into account a substantial rebate granted 
to the UK https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/dominic-cummings-brexit-referendum-
won/. The pledge to spend £ 350 m on the NHS was dismissed by Leavers soon after the 
referendum result (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-nhs-350m-a-
week-eu-change-britain-gisela-stuart-referendum-bus-a7236706.html). 
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arguments largely reproduced the macro argumentative schemes underpinned by the 
topos of sovereignty loss (as discussed earlier) to reject Europe as a political project. In 
some cases, the leave arguments were also realised through topoi of risk avoidance for 
example in relation to the Euro crisis: 
Extract 7 
It is not unreasonable to assume that a ‘Yes’ vote will be taken as a mandate for the 
UK to one day join the Euro – and effectively sail towards disaster. A ‘No’ vote at 
the upcoming referendum on EU membership is the only way to prevent an 
inevitable slide towards further economic and political integration before it’s too 
late. 
In a few other instances, political arguments were mostly driven by the topos of 
(inter)national influence which represented the EU as an arena of national interests to 
be defended and Britain’s political power inside it dwindling. In these cases, the 
argument for leaving the EU relied on representations of the UK as a minor actor 
ostracized by a more powerful and hostile European alliance: 
Extract 8 
If we vote to remain in the EU it will mean staying in a European Union where the 
UK can be automatically outvoted, where we can’t veto unwanted regulations and 
where unelected judges can overturn more and more UK laws. That’s why the safer 
option is to Vote Leave and take back control.  
Notably, one of the most frequent argumentative schemes supporting the leave choice as 
an ideological resistance to a dominant ‘ever closer Union’ was supported by negative 
representations of the supremacy of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ‘meddling’ 
with British affairs and with the British legal system. The goal premise of ‘freeing 
Britain from the ECJ rule’ derived from this representation spanned interdiscursively to 
warrant arguments of economic independence and of control over immigration. For 
example, the proposition that by leaving the EU Britain would avoid obeying the 
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economic and financial rules imposed by the ECJ was predicated on discourses of the 
‘burden of red tape’ and limitations to ‘free trade’ (cf. extract 8 above). Similarly, 
negative representations of the ECJ ruling over the British government in relation to the 
attribution or removal of citizenship rights were frequently invoked in the leave 
campaign and acted as circumstantial premises along the macro argumentative scheme 
of ‘loss of sovereignty’ to legitimize the leave vote as in the following example: 
Extract 9 
If we vote to stay, EU judges will decide who gets British citizenship. The ECJ 
[…] has used EU citizenship to take more and more powers from the UK, 
including over whether criminals and illegal immigrants can stay, requiring social 
security to be paid to EU migrants, undermining the UK’s border controls and 
expanding prisoner voting rights. 
In most cases however, the argument about typical functions of the state (citizenship 
rights and border control) allegedly being taking over by the EU is a particularised 
discourse which conflates the remit of ECJ and European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)6 but which nevertheless appealed to popular imagination in discourses of 
‘border vulnerability’. This and other related arguments on the ‘issue’ of immigration 
are discussed in more detail in the next section.  
Immigration-related arguments 
Since VL was nominated as the official candidate for the leave side, its campaign 
increasingly focused on themes of immigration. Whilst still pushing an agenda for free 
trade and sovereignty, the imperative to ‘take control’ became discursively mobilised in 
                                                 
6 The ECHR was established prior to and independently of the EU in 1953 with the UK being 
one of its key promoters of its introduction. It has been adopted by a number of countries 
(including Turkey and Russia) which are not necessarily EU members states.  
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favour of arguments that initially problematized immigration - albeit through a rather 
neutral stance - through the topos of numbers as in the extracts below: 
Extract 9 
More than a quarter of a million people came to the UK from the EU in the 12 
months to September 2015 – the equivalent of a city the size of Plymouth or 
Newcastle in a year. If this rate continues for a decade, there will be more than two 
million extra people. Many immigrants contribute to our society. They also affect 
public services. Experts disagree on the overall effect. 
Later in the campaign, negative representations of immigration became increasingly 
prevalent and contributed to construct an overarching discursive scenario of ‘moral 
panic’ (Stanley, 1973) about immigrants. Against this scenario the leave choice was 
legitimised through fallacies of risk avoidance and public safety. Figure 5 below 
exemplifies a typical argument circulated on the VL website (and widely echoed in the 
press) between late April and the referendum date, namely that the EU was secretly 
planning to give millions of Turks visa-free access to Europe7. The diagram clearly 
suggests the ‘risky’ option of staying in the EU by depicting Britain ‘targeted’ by over 
80 millions of migrants from candidate EU countries, an argument that rests on the 
fallacious assumption of mass migration from those countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See for example https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1271200/more-than-100000-turks-a-year-
will-flock-to-britain-after-it-joins-the-eu-pushing-net-migration-to-a-staggering-420000/ 
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Figure 5. Misrepresentation of mass migration from EU candidate countries. Source: Why vote leave? The Facts. 
Available at http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/our_case.html. Accessed 25/5/2016  
 
In some cases, VL’s escalation of moral panic about migrants relied on conflating 
distinct representations of free movement of people within the EU and representations 
of illegal immigration, a strategy that had similarly being deployed by UKIP and which 
was epitomized by the infamous ‘Breaking point’ poster released a week before the 
referendum8. Figure 6 exemplifies a semiotic realisation of how this conflation of 
discourses occurred within the argumentative scheme ‘if Britain remains in the EU, this 
will happen/continue’. The written text on the left recontextualises the argument in 
Extract 9 above on the numbers of EU migrants. In this case, however, the argument is 
                                                 
8 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-
poster-queue-of-migrants 
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reinforced via a visual association which clearly misrepresents freedom of movement 
exercised by EU citizens as what one would perceive as people illegally trespassing a 
border, an image which capitalises on irrational fear of immigration and which 
recontextualises wider discourses of Europe’s reaction to the refugee crisis. 
  
Figure 6. Misrepresentation of EU immigrants as illegal immigrants. Source: Why vote leave? The Facts. Available 
at http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/our_case.html. Accessed 25/5/2016 
  
 
 
The moral panic about immigrants was also constructed through discursive scenarios 
focusing on the threat of terrorist attacks and border vulnerability with the thrust of the 
discourse provided by topoi of security and public safety which legitimised the leave 
choice as the ability to stop criminals entering Britain. In some cases, these arguments 
were realised through negative representations of the ECJ disempowering Britain (see 
Extracts 8 and 9 above) and on the goal premise of regaining control over immigration 
relying on a distorted logic that conflates immigrants with criminals and terrorists as in 
the following extracts: 
Extract 10 
Our border controls are under constant attack from the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Last year, the ECJ said that our Government cannot require migrants from 
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other EU states to have a permit issued by UK authorities, even though permits 
from other EU countries are systematically forged, some EU countries sell their 
passports, and we have no control over the way other EU countries issue their 
passports. This makes it easier for terrorists and criminals to get into Britain. 
Extract 11 
Being in the EU makes it easier for terrorists to come to Britain - EU law forbids 
countries in the Schengen area from carrying out systematic checks on anyone with 
an EU passport from entering. This makes it much easier for terrorists fighting 
abroad to return to Britain, who need not pass through a single border control 
between arriving on the shores of Greece and reaching the English Channel. With 
terrorist groups launching attacks on Europe, more and more EU states are finding 
that they have to defy the EU and reintroduce border controls to keep people safe. 
In these two examples the argument for leaving is supported by the main warrant that 
“being in the EU makes it easier for terrorists to come to Britain”. This circumstantial 
premise is, in turn, articulated through different ambiguous premises (in extract 10 the 
supposed corruption of other EU countries) or more explicit fallacies (Extract 11), the 
most obvious one being that the UK is not in the Schengen area and it has always 
retained the power to control its borders over movement of people from Schengen 
countries.  The need to control borders which is invoked here to legitimise the leave 
choice seems to apply to a general openness of Europe (stretching ‘from the shores of 
Greece to the English Channel’) and a perceived threat that such lack of borders would 
pose to Britain. However the representation of domestic security supposedly guaranteed 
by a system of international borders appears further contradicted by the representation 
of ‘terrorists who return to Britain’ if one assumes that such terrorists were British 
citizens in the first place and further highlight the contradiction of Britain wanting to be 
in control of its borders whilst expecting other countries to patrol them. 
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5. Conclusion: A toxic (inter)national logic of Brexit 
 
This paper has illuminated the discursive legitimization of Brexit in the messages of the 
official Leave/Remain campaigns, two key actors in the institutional framing of the 
referendum debate. It has highlighted how the institutional framing of the campaign 
allowed for two opposed camps to emerge and for specific discourses and interests to 
polarize around the ‘in’ and ‘out’ choices. The analysis has provided evidence of how 
trade and immigration acted as the two key discursive elements which drove the 
(de)legitimisation of Brexit appealing to both rational and emotional argumentative 
schemes. The analysis has also shown that BSE mainly engaged with economic topics 
focusing on discursive strategies which, on the one hand, highlighted the positive 
impact of Britain’s membership of the EU on trade and jobs while, on the other, 
emphasized the risk of leaving the EU by projecting a series of negative consequences 
for citizens and households. Similarly to BSE, early discourses of the Leave campaign 
engaged with economic arguments. However, in contrast to BSE, VL’s strategies were 
primarily aimed at delegitimizing the EU as ‘dominating’ and ‘constraining’ the UK in 
its trading potential and ‘meddling’ with its national sovereignty. Becoming 
independent from the EU’s antagonistic power provided thus the main legitimacy thrust 
to VL’s discourses, which were typically realized via the ‘take (back) control’ slogan. 
Notably, as the campaign progressed, immigration increasingly gained currency in VL’s 
discourses by becoming a central topic of the campaign. In this respect, VL’s discursive 
strategies contributed significantly to the construction of the ‘moral panic’ of mass 
migration and, against this scenario, the legitimation of Brexit occurred through 
fallacies of numbers and public safety and through misrepresentations of the EU’s 
freedom of movement. 
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The analysis has provided a body of evidence for a critical reading of Brexit showing 
that the choice over the UK/Europe relationship encapsulated in the vague binaries 
‘leave’ and ‘remain’ acted as a powerful catalyst for the (de)legitimation of certain 
ideologies, the imagination of certain world orders, the reproduction of certain 
narratives of Britain and Europe. 
Firstly, albeit from opposite grounds, the two campaigns largely framed the 
Brexit debate within representations of Europe as a zero-sum trading exercise. Whilst 
BSE relied on representations of the Single Market to legitimize the status quo as 
desirable for the UK, VL’s campaign reproduced a neoliberal intergovernmental agenda 
advocating for a looser global trading system in which the UK could be a freer and 
much better-off actor taking advantage of global opportunities without the existing 
regulations of the Single Market. This vision, encapsulated in the topos of sovereignty 
loss, legitimized the leave choice as a matter of national interests to be safeguarded and 
pursued as much as an act of independence from the EU. 
Secondly, by taking a nation-centric stance (i.e. speaking to and for the nation), 
the messages of the two campaigns largely reproduced historical conceptualizations of 
Britishness vis-à-vis a European ‘other’. Whereas BSE accommodated the European 
(economic) narrative into that of the ‘imagined’ British nation, VL voiced a resurgent 
form of English nationalism by recontextualising discourses of a distinct British 
political and cultural exceptionalism which is not compatible with the European project. 
These representations were particularly prevalent in arguments supported by the topos 
of national influence which indexes different nation-centric views. Whilst, by and large, 
BSE represented national influence viable within a EU-ropean space and achievable 
through intra-national cooperation, VL used the same topos to argue for national 
independence and for forms of intergovernmentalism alternative to EU membership 
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appealing to the narrative of Britain’s glorious past and its economic and political global 
role.  
Thirdly, VL recontextualized UKIP’s anti-immigration agenda ideologically 
rooted in a divisive and populist reading of immigration as a problem of ‘us and them’ 
that governments must solve (Richardson, 2008) and reproducing a politics of identity 
which largely projects a sense of solidarity strictly within national rather than 
transnational boundaries. In this sense, representations of Europe in its cultural, civic, 
and social democratic dimensions were notably absent. Similarly, both referendum 
campaigns silenced the question of Scotland and Ireland reproducing a dominant 
English-centered vision of the internal cohesion of Britain. This discursive hegemony 
largely reflects the specific vested interests represented by the two organizations 
examined bringing into the public arena selected representations of Britain and/in 
Europe which contributed to the normalization of (symbolic) borders and the 
relegitimation of national identities in the public opinion. 
Crucially, the specific discursive articulation of trade and immigration emerged 
in the Brexit referendum campaign engendered and legitimized a new toxic 
(inter)national logic: by leaving the EU, Britain ‘takes back control’ to pursue 
mercantile policies whose benefits ‘outsiders’ should be excluded from. At a time of 
another major European crisis driven by populist and nationalist discourses, the Brexit 
referendum campaigns conspicuously failed to represent Europe in its social and 
supranational dimensions and to make the case for Europe as a transnational project of 
solidarity and social justice.    
Of course, as the analysis has focused on the discourses of these two semi-institutional 
organisations, it would benefit from complimentary further investigation of how such 
discourses were received and consumed by other actors in other sites. 
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